

**A Review of the Pakistan Flood Relief and Early Recovery Response Plan
(PFRERRP)**

Up to December 31, 2010

By the

National Disaster Management Authority

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DNA	Damage Needs Assessment
ERF	Emergency Response Fund
EU	European Union
FTS	Financial Tracking Service
KPK	Khyber Pakhtun Khwa
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MCRAM	Multi-cluster Rapid Assessment Mechanism
NDMA	National Disaster Management Authority
OCHA	Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PFRERP	Pakistan Flood Relief and Early Recovery Response Plan
SRF	Single Reporting Format

INTRODUCTION

A. Background

1. Over the course of the 2010 monsoon season, Pakistan experienced the worst floods in its history. The floods affected 20 million people in more than 78 districts of the country devastating villages from the Himalayas to the Arabian Sea. More than 1,985 people lost their lives, and at least 1.6 million homes were damaged or destroyed. The geographical scale of this disaster and the number of people affected made this a bigger and more complex situation than almost any other ever faced by the humanitarian community. The relief and early recovery needs arising out of the floods were unprecedented. In response, the United Nations Humanitarian Community prepared the Pakistan Flood Relief and Early Recovery Response Plan (PFRERRP). The relief phase of the plan sought to directly preserve life, health, safety, livelihoods and dignity and was expected to be completed by January 31, 2011. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) feels that six months after the floods, it is time to review the achievements of the Response Plan thus far. This document presents the key findings of this initial review. The purpose of the review is (i) to assess the progress made up to December 31, 2010 (ii) assess the performance of the implementing partners (iii) assess the adequacy of the approach and systems that have been put in place for damage assessment, relief and early recovery (iv) assess the implementation capacity, co-ordination arrangements and monitoring and evaluation systems and (v) identify key issues and challenges to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of meeting the objectives of the Plan.

B. The Pakistan Floods Relief and Early Recovery Response Plan

2. The humanitarian community in Pakistan launched the Pakistan Initial Floods Emergency Response Plan (PIFERP) on 11 August seeking an initial US\$ 459 million for the immediate relief needs of flood-affected people. Following this a revised appeal was launched to take into account the continuing damage caused by the floods as it spread to other parts of the country and greater clarity emerged regarding the actual needs and the growing numbers of affected people. A revised Pakistan Flood Relief and Early Recovery Response Plan (PFRERRP) was prepared in November 2010 by the United Nation's Office and an appeal of US\$ 1.9 billion was launched. The overarching goal of the Response Plan was to prevent excess morbidity and mortality and to enable flood-affected communities to return to their normal lives. The strategic objectives of the Plan were described as follows.¹

- a) Ensure adequate public health of the flood-affected population through an integrated approach or "survival strategy" combining Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), health, food and nutrition. Public health surveillance will identify priority areas for the restoration of basic WASH, health and nutrition facilities and services.
- b) Provide food assistance and other social protection measures to offer a basic safety net, especially to the most vulnerable.
- c) Support sustainable solutions through the provision of shelter assistance, prioritizing interventions that can span emergency shelter, transitional shelter and core housing needs.
- d) Restore on and off-farm livelihoods, with a focus on agriculture, livestock, and protection and restoration of productive assets.
- e) Restore basic community services and supporting the re-establishment of public administration, health, and education systems.

3. The Plan was considered a "living document" whose elements were to continue to evolve with the availability of new information and the deployment of additional capacity. The key needs for which the funds were requested included food (30%), shelter and non-food items (17%), water and sanitation (13%), health (13%) and agriculture (9%), etc. The Plan included 353 project proposals from 153

¹ Pakistan Flood Relief and Early Recovery Response Plan. Page 1.

organizations² for the relief and early recovery response for 12 different sectors. The extent to which this Response Plan was expected to address the overall needs of relief and early recovery varied somewhat by cluster. In terms of affected population, the Response Plan intended to deal with 100% of the people affected by the disaster in meeting their shelter, health and agriculture needs, 70% of the people affected in terms of meeting their food, water, sanitation and hygiene needs, 35% of the people in meeting nutrition needs, 58% for protection needs and 14% of those affected in meeting education needs. Where there was less than 100% coverage. It was expected that Government of Pakistan would take on the responsibility to meet the relief and recovery needs of those not covered in the Plan itself or through help of the military, corporate sector and others. Table 1 below gives the affected population and the proportion that the Response Plan was proposing to target in each cluster and the population which had been covered by the end of December 2010. There are certain clusters for which exact information on the coverage is difficult to assess.

Table 1: Population Affected and Planned Beneficiaries Under the Response Plan

Cluster	People in need of assistance	Planned beneficiaries (per cluster)	People reached by the cluster by December 2010.	% of people in need of assistance targeted by cluster
Needs and gap analysis of clusters included in the initial Floods Emergency Response Plan				
Food	10.1 million ³	6.4 million ⁴	7 million ⁵	60%
Shelter	13 million	13 million ⁶	5.478 million provided emergency shelter 814,142 people provided one room or transitional shelters	100%
WASH	20.6 million	13.3 million	3.2 million as reported in November 2010.	67%
Health	11 million	11 million	8 million people had access to outreach health services 6.7 million provided medicine	100%
Nutrition	13.3 million	460,000 children < five, 800,000 pregnant and lactating women	37,000 as reported in November 2010	35%
Protection	10.1 million	5 million	500,000 as reported in November 2010	58%
Needs and gap analysis of clusters NOT included in the initial Floods Emergency Response Plan				
Agriculture	7 million*	7 million	529,481 households provided with wheat seeds, fertilizers and 1/2 kg vegetable seeds. 282,703 households owning livestock provided veterinary services.	100%

2 The PFRERRP. Table II, page 5.

3 Based on WFP Initial VAM. Figure is based on loss of assets. Those households were included which had (i) houses completely destroyed by the floods; (ii) whose houses were significantly damaged and rendered uninhabitable; and (iii) who suffered extensive crop loss.

4 Assumes that around 40% of the required food assistance will be provided by actors who are not part of the Floods Emergency Response Plan, including the civilian Government, the military and others.

5 This includes in-kind assistance provided to date by the UN and major NGOs, but excludes cash transfers or assistance provided by the government..

6 Calculated using an average household size of seven people

			However, it appears that all the people in need of inputs have been provided inputs except parts of Sindh.	
Community restoration	20.6 million	Varies by sub-sector (average of 55% of people in need)	None as reported by November 2010*	varies
Education	9 million children	1.3 million children, teachers and parents	23,475 children 5,790 adolescents & adults	14%

4. The Plan included a wide range of projects. The largest number of projects was submitted for community restoration (63) followed by shelter and non-food items (59), health (58), water and sanitation (42) and protection (41). However, the number of projects was not linked to the volume of financing as can be seen by the fact that the food cluster had among the smallest number of projects but the largest volume of financing. The community restoration cluster included a lot of proposals which did not belong specifically to any one cluster. This partly explains the large number of projects categorised under this cluster. What was significant by its absence in the Plan was the small number of proposals submitted by local NGOs. A majority of the proposals were submitted by international NGOs. This can partly be explained by the limited capacity of local NGOs to prepare good proposals and partly by the limited presence of the better known NGOs in the cluster process. Particularly significant by its absence in the Flood Response Plan was the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund. What was even more surprising was that none of the well known NGOs which had submitted project proposals such as the large Rural Support Programmes were able to secure direct funding under the Plan. While most of them were subsequently engaged in the flood response through direct engagement by the donors or as implementing partners to one of the UN agencies. Only a few NGOs like Taraqee Foundation and Strengthening Participatory Organizations (SPO) were able to obtain a small amount of funds under the Response Plan. Table 2 below gives a list of clusters and the number of organizations submitting projects proposals for the Plan.

Table 2: Number of Proposing Organizations In Each Cluster

Cluster	No of Orgs
Agriculture	21
Community Restoration	63
Education	22
Food	13
Health	58
Nutrition	22
Protection	41
Shelter & Non-Food Items	59
Water, Sanitation & Hygiene	42
Camp Coordination & Camp Management	2
Coordination & Support Services	6
Logistics & Emergency	4

Total 353

C. Achievements and Outcomes

5. The floods of 2010 were the worst disaster ever to confront Pakistan. The magnitude of the tragedy was beyond the scope of any single government or agency to handle. The Flash Appeal of almost US\$ 2 billion launched by United Nations was the largest appeals ever by the UN system and was twice the size of the appeal that was launched in the aftermath of the destruction caused by the Tsunami for six countries combined. The crisis generated a massive outpouring of compassion and resources. The tragedy called in to action the combined efforts of the Government of Pakistan, the military, support from foreign countries, the United Nation's Humanitarian Community, international organizations, the civil society, the corporate sector, philanthropic support from the Pakistani Diaspora community and financial contributions from individuals as well as support in kind and volunteering of time. It is estimated that more than US\$ 2 billion have been received through official aid agencies both within and outside the UN Response Plan. The contributions by the corporate sector and individual philanthropists are not included in these estimates but are reported to be significant.⁷ The Government has made US\$ 2.63 billion⁸ available for various measures during the relief and early recovery period including the cash transfer for the Watan cards.

6. The Flash Appeal was hugely successful in meeting a critical resource gap in the country for relief and early recovery efforts. OCHA's Financial Tracking Service (FTS) estimates that Pakistan received commitments of USD 979 million or 51% of the appeal amount up to December 31, 2010. Of the funds received, 34% were for food, 10% for health, 9% for agriculture, 7% for water and sanitation and 6% for shelter and non-food items. The use of 26% was allocated by agency but not specified as to which cluster it would be allocated towards. The clusters which attracted the most allocation included food, health, agriculture, water and sanitation. Table 3 below gives a summary of the funding requirements and commitments by cluster up to December 2010. However, information regarding actual expenditures has not been shared with the NDMA. It is not clear if this information is available and who is coordinating the recording of expenditures within the cluster.

Table 3: Funding Requirements & Commitments by Cluster – December 31, 2010

Cluster	Funding Requirements (US\$)	Funding Committed (US\$)	(%) of Cluster Needs Met	Funding Requested as (%) of Total Requirements	Funding Received as (%) of Total Funding
Agriculture	170,552,906	89,771,956	0.53	0.09	0.09
Coordination & Support Services	82,201,603	49,005,639	0.60	0.04	0.05
Economic Recovery & Infrastructure	167,073,420	5,188,122	0.03	0.09	0.01
Education	83,402,534	7,771,270	0.09	0.04	0.01
Food	573,284,476	336,114,544	0.59	0.30	0.34
Health	243,649,791	93,964,315	0.39	0.13	0.10
Protection Shelter & Non-Food Items	52,932,153	6,826,094	0.13	0.03	0.01
Water & Sanitation	321,089,320	62,971,126	0.20	0.17	0.06
Unspecified	244,021,075	71,285,673	0.29	0.13	0.07
GRAND TOTAL	1,938,207,278	979,308,627	0.51	1.00	1.00

⁷ NDMA is attempting to collect this information systematically from different sources in as far as is possible.

⁸ The Planning Commission as quoted in the NDMA Information Management Strategy. January 2011.

7. In order to provide immediate assistance, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) had released nearly \$30 million and had pledged an additional \$10 million to nine UN agencies and IOM in response to the widespread flooding in Pakistan. The Emergency Relief Coordinator had approved the first allocation of \$16.6 million by 10 August to jumpstart life-saving activities. A second allocation of \$13.3 million was released between 27 August and 1 September to bolster and expand operations. CERF funds were used to support emergency shelter and NFIs, food, health care, water and sanitation services as well as vital common services for the humanitarian community, including telecommunications, aviation services and security. The Emergency Response Fund (ERF) was activated at the beginning of September to provide international and national NGOs, UN agencies, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) with rapid and flexible initial funds to respond to the floods. By mid-September, more than 30 projects in the priority Food, Health, WASH, and Shelter and NFI Clusters had been selected for funding, for a total of more than \$8 million. Six donors and numerous private individuals had contributed \$12.6 million to the fund. This proved a good mechanism for providing immediate relief in a flexible manner. WFP was also very efficient in deploying its field offices for immediate food distribution in the flood affected areas in Khyber Pakhtun Khwa (KPK) as soon as the affects of the flood became known in that province. However, despite such a rapid response, the overall perception that was created was that the response effort was slow and did not have the capacity for quick deployment. Part of the explanation for this perception is that the affects of the floods were so widespread that it was difficult to respond to the multiple needs of the affected population. Regarding the accessing of the CERF and ERF funds, NDMA feels that the selection procedure is somewhat vague and has not been fully elaborated. NDMA had been asked to be on the selection Board for these funds but did not send a nominee. In hindsight this was a mistake. NDMA has requested OCHA several times to expedite the process of selection of projects through ERF but it continues to be slow.

8. There were 22 main bilateral donors which provided funds for the response plan. However, 63% of the funds came from just four major donors such as the United States of America (35%) Saudi Arabia (13%), United Kingdom (8%) and the European Commission (7%). As is evident, most funding came from a small group of traditional donors. A large number of non-traditional bilateral donors provided funding outside the Response Plan either directly to the Federal Government or to the affected population. In some cases donors were also approaching provincial governments directly. Almost half of the donor funding was provided outside the Response Plan. This indicated the preference to provide funds through diverse channels rather than directing them all through the UN system or the formal channels. The trend in individual, corporate and diaspora philanthropy also indicates that Pakistanis prefer to give to individuals directly rather than public institutions. This trend was also evident during the floods when a large amount of immediate relief assistance was given by individuals directly to flood affected households.⁹ Many individuals and corporate philanthropists by-passed both the Government, the UN system and civil society organizations. This kind of relief was also the type which was most rapidly deployed and was the first to reach the affected people.

II. THE PROCESS, SYSTEMS AND MECHANISMS

A. Damage Assessments

9. The Government line agencies at the district level played a key role in the initial damage assessment. The District Coordinator Officers and the Deputy Commissioners provided the information to

⁹ Aga Khan Development Network, (2000), " *The Dimensions of Individual Giving*" in "*Philanthropy in Pakistan: A Report of the Initiative on Indigenous Philanthropy*" pp-43-70. Corporate Giving: NGO Resource Centre and Sidat Hyder and an Exploratory Study into the Nature and Dimensions of Corporate Philanthropy in Pakistan. PCP December 2004.

the Provincial Disaster Management Authorities. This information was coordinated at the national level by the National Disaster Management Authority. This information was also verified by the UN system through its own teams of male and female coordinators. The UN agencies initiated the task of damage assessment almost immediately as soon the danger from the floods became evident. The Multi-cluster Rapid Assessment Mechanism (McRAM), a post-emergency assessment tool that uses questions designed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) was initiated to assess the damage.¹⁰ The McRAM has become the accepted initial joint emergency assessment tool among the humanitarian community and it has proved to be an effective tool in producing relevant data in time. It has been used in Pakistan several times since its introduction in March 2008.¹¹ The MCRAM assessment was undertaken by teams of male and female researchers with close to 2500 households in 383 villages and settlements. The aim of the assessment was to reach a purposive sample of the most affected districts and communities and produce a detailed summary of findings in line with the information needs defined by the clusters. Overall, the assessment found that the immediate priorities of households affected by the floods were to secure food supplies and adequate shelter. In order to recover from the affects of the floods, households perceived their main needs to be financial assistance, repair and rehabilitation of livelihood assets including land reclamation, and material assistance in terms of rebuilding houses and livestock related assets.

10. The MCRAM survey reported that about 42% of households surveyed reported that their house was completely destroyed. About 9% of households surveyed reported that their house was not damaged, 86% of households owned the land they lived on prior to the floods. About 27% thought they had lost the land their house was built on. About 53% of the households in the survey report used some kind of water treatment method. Only 28% of households reported having appropriate, safe water storage. Less than 20% of households had access to a toilet that was considered to be clean and in good working order. Fever, skin disease and diarrhoea were the most common health concerns in the communities. Households reported resorting to a range of coping strategies to deal with the floods such as borrowing, reducing meal size, skipping meals and women eating less than men. A small number of households reported they would spend less on health care in order to purchase food and others reported they would withdraw children from school. The highest priority in terms of the restoration of community infrastructure for both male and female community groups were said to be mosques. The most frequently mentioned reason for children not going to school by both male and female community groups in the areas surveyed was that the schools had been damaged in the floods. About 61% of the surveyed households had access to a health facility within an hour of where they were staying. Many of these health facilities were damaged to some degree. There were very few services available for women (such as, separate women's shelters, psychological counseling, legal aid, ID card issuance, or separate women's health facilities).

11. Farming had reduced from around 50% of household's main form of livelihood to being cited as the main source of livelihood for less than 10%. Agricultural losses were dramatic. KPK reported agricultural land lost of around 50%. For Gilgit Baltistan, Punjab and Sind, surveyed households estimated losses to cropland of between 90% to 100%. Almost 50% of the households growing cotton reported losing their entire crop. Over 40% of households reported losing either major part or all of their rice crop. The most often cited reason for the inability to plant the next crop was that households did not expect the flood water to recede in time. Significant losses were reported in animal fodder. In spite of losses, households still possessed livestock. A large proportion of fodder had been lost so feed for these animals was a priority. About 55% of the households not engaged in agriculture reported that their business or employment situation had been "totally affected" by the floods. Only 19% of households

¹⁰ Personal Digital Assistants technology is used by well-trained field teams to provide rapid feedback on the emergency situation.

¹¹ In August 2008, it was used in communities displaced from Bajour agency into areas of Lower Dir and Malakand districts of North West Frontier Province. Afterwards, it was used to assess the situation of IDPs in NWFP, Earthquake affectees in Balochistan and drought affected in Tharparker. A rapid needs assessment of IDPs was also previously initiated by the UNICEF and WFP adopting the McRAM.

reported that their non-agricultural livelihood had not been impacted. The percentage of households describing themselves as without a main source of livelihood had increased from 10% before the flood to almost 60%.

12. These findings gave an indication of which areas to focus on broadly but it is difficult to see how these findings were translated into the Response Plan with its very precise targets and budgets. The methodology for transforming these needs into projects in the Response Plan have not been shared with NDMA. Due to the fact that the McCRAM was undertaken at a very early stage (July-August) it was difficult to assess with any great degree of surety as to the type of support which would be required for some sectors such as agriculture after the passage of time. This initial assessment was followed up by a more comprehensive Damage Needs Assessment (DNA) by the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank to assess the reconstruction needs. The DNA focused on medium to long-term reconstruction and provided the guiding principles for recovery. The total damage assessed by the DNA was valued at US\$ 10.056 billion. The most significant damage was caused to the agriculture sector (USD 5.045 billion) followed by housing (USD 1.59 billion), transport and communications (USD 1.33 billion).

13. The National Disaster Management Authority feels that overall the McRAM did not give a complete assessment of the needs of each sector but it provided the basis for a quick assessment in an emergency. NDMA obtained feedback on the use of this tool at the provincial and district level and found that there was general agreement that the mechanisms to assess the damage was participatory and Government line agencies were involved in the process. While the NDMA feels that the McRAM has generally met its objectives of providing a rapid tool for assessment of the impact of the floods there are some concerns about the sample of villages selected and the degree of confidence associated with its findings and its ability to assess the overall volume of financing required. The McRAM assessment also attempted to appropriately balance a level of gender and age disaggregation with the constraints of time and access that were necessarily a part of the emergency nature of the assessment. Those conducting the McRAM felt they had obtained the views of both men and women at the community and household level in a way considered suitable and context appropriate by gender specialists. The absence of women's privacy in the post-flood context came out as a strong theme in the McRAM. However, the systematic translation of the gender needs into the projects in the response plan appear to be weak both in terms of implementation of a gender sensitive approach, meeting the specific needs of women as well as monitoring of gender disaggregated data.

Table 4: Damage Needs Assessment- Floods 2010

Sector	Direct Damages PKR millions	Indirect Losses PKR millions	Total Damage	
			PKR millions	USD millions
1. Social Infrastructure				
Housing	91,843	43,171	135,014	1,588
Health	1,562	2,661	4,222	50
Education	22,047	4,418	26,464	311
Subtotal	115,451	50,249	165,700	1,949
2. Physical Infrastructure				
Irrigation & Flood Management	23,600		23,600	278
Transport & Communications	62,491	50,420	112,911	1,328

Water Supply & Sanitation	3,194	6,112	9,306	109
Energy	13,184	13,116	26,300	309
Subtotal	102,469	69,648	172,117	2,025

3. Economic Sectors

Agriculture, Livestock & Fisheries	315,547	113,257	428,805	5,045
Private Sector & Industries	14,463	9,468	23,932	282
Financial Sector	110	57,141	57,251	674
Subtotal	330,120	179,866	509,987	6,000

4. Cross Cutting Sectors

Governance	3,141	2,835	5,976	70
Environment	992		992	12
Subtotal	4,133	2,835	6,968	82
Total	552,173	302,599	854,771	10,056

B. Analysis of the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP)

14. The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) was used to coordinate the response to the Pakistan Floods by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). A Flash Appeal was launched and a pooled Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) was established to provide timely and flexible funding for the floods. The United Nations Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) has been devised by the UN to respond to emergencies worldwide. OCHA also managed the Financial Tracking Service, a self-reporting database for providers and recipients of humanitarian funding, which monitors the extent to which the needs of people in crisis are being met through contributions. The CAP process was effective in bringing the UN together in Pakistan to focus on the floods and was also successful in raising funds for the largest appeal ever launched by the UN system. While the UN system was able to put together funding for the key areas that required immediate action, there was lack of sharing of the process with key Government agencies at the Federal, provincial and district level. There was little explanation to Government counterparts of the process which had been used to invite proposals and the selection criteria used to include projects in the proposal. While the provincial Governments acknowledged that they had been consulted during the damage assessment phase they did not think they had been engaged sufficiently in the selection of the projects. This points to a weakness in the manner in which the projects are put together.

15. A review of the projects included in the Response Plan by the National Disaster Management Authority gave the impression that there was not sufficient screening of the projects and most had been included without an adequate analysis of the capacity and experience of the proposing organization or an analysis of how the project related to the identified needs and gaps. The proposals submitted by the UN agencies often appeared to be hurriedly prepared without any standardized bench marks against which they could be evaluated in terms of the unit costs proposed or other criteria to assess efficiency and cost-

effectiveness. Some of the weakest proposals appeared to be those prepared by the UN Agencies themselves. There was also a lack of a system of coordination that identified whether there was duplication with a project that had been included in the Response Plan. Furthermore, there was no mechanism for funding purposes to send to underfunded priority areas. For example, the agriculture sector needs of Sindh had been underfunded initially and a special action was recommended by NDMA to address this gap outside of the appeal process.

16. While NDMA is deeply appreciative of the untiring efforts that the UN agencies had demonstrated to assist Pakistan in these very challenging times, the Authority was concerned that there was a significant shortfall in the financing for the Response Plan and there was a need for a clear prioritization of the different projects together with the NDMA to ensure that a shared list of priorities and selection criterion had been adopted and used. NDMA was also concerned about the absorptive capacity of local and international NGOs to deal with the relief and early recovery efforts. There were some organizations which had tremendous zeal but little demonstrated capacity to respond to relief and early recovery efforts. While some experienced international NGOs had also responded and submitted projects, NDMA was concerned about their limited experience in Pakistan. The excessive reliance on the international organizations and the limited involvement of local organizations was an area of concern especially in the remote parts of Pakistan affected by the floods.

17. In view of some of these concerns, NDMA considered it prudent to refine the selection criterion by defining a set of underlying principles for the selection of organizations and projects in the PFRERRP. These principles included the following (i) Projects which do not directly contribute to the objectives of the cluster under which they appear should not be selected for financing (ii) projects which are ambiguous in terms of what they are expected to achieve and which do not clearly specify the targets which are to be achieved in keeping with the indicators specified for the cluster should not be financed (iii) Projects with an overhead cost of more than 20% of the total cost should not be financed with the exception of projects in the health sector (iv) No project proposal should be accepted for financing until it clearly specifies the unit cost of the different outputs it is expected to deliver (v) In the case of outliers in terms of the unit cost of outputs to be delivered no proposal should be accepted until a proper justification is sought for the higher cost figures (vi) no Implementing Partner should be directly selected for financing of projects if it does not have previous implementing experience in the cluster for which it has submitted a proposal (vii) there should be a ceiling imposed on the UN agencies in terms of the proportion of the costs which they seek to cover the administration costs of the projects in each cluster.

18. While some projects were excluded from the Response plan based on these principles, there has been limited sharing by the UN Agencies of how the projects performed against the specified criteria as little financial information has been provided to the NDMA. Once the Response Plan was signed off by the Government, it was not kept informed of any changes or revisions despite of its position as the co chairman of the various clusters. . The Financial Tracking System of OCHA doe not provide expenditure reports. This is a matter of serious concern. A review of the Financial Tracking System (FTS) indicates that by the end of December 2010, the plan had expanded to include 368 projects. However, only 89 of these projects had actually been financed either partly or wholly. The progress on those partially funded or fully funded projects has not been shared with Government. The UN claims that the decision to select projects and select agencies is taken directly by the donor agencies and is not entirely up to the UN agencies except for those funds which are allocated to the Central Emergency Relief Fund. This itself is against the principals of Paris Declaration in which government was visualized as taking the lead in priority setting and not the other way around. What is evident is that 88% of the committed funding will be directed through the UN agencies and the rest will be channeled through international non-governmental organizations like Save the Children, Merlin, Care International, Oxfam, etc. There has been little information sharing with NDMA on the mechanisms to ensure accountability within the UN agencies and the International Organizations. Reports on their performance have not been shared with NDMA. Few of the local NGOs have directly received funding under the Response Plan. In most clusters, there are unspecified funds allocated to UN Agencies against which no details have been provided. In addition, each UN Agency has allocated funds not yet assigned to any sector. Table 5 below presents a list of total projects submitted, projects funded and the proportion of funding received by the UN Agencies.

Table 5: Total Projects, Approved Projects and Proportion of Financing Used by UN Agencies

Luster	Total Projects	Projects Funded	UN		Total Funding (US\$)	(% of Total To UN Agencies)
			Agencies (US\$)	Total Funding (US\$)		
Agriculture	24	6	78,940,852	89,771,956	0.88	
Coordination & Support Services	13	7	49,005,639	49,005,639	1.00	
Economic Recovery & Infrastructure	62	5	4,327,916	5,188,122	0.83	
Education	22	1	7,771,270	7,771,270	1.00	
Food	14	9	313,462,132	336,114,544	0.93	
Health	62	18	74,699,444	93,964,315	0.79	
Protection Shelter & Non-Food Items	48	3	6,192,973	6,826,094	0.91	
Water & Sanitation	63	15	40,984,838	62,971,126	0.65	
Unspecified	52	20	53,901,197	71,285,673	0.76	
	8	5	256,409,888	256,409,888	1.00	
	368	89	885,696,149	979,308,627		

C. The Cluster Approach for Disaster Management

19. The concept of the Cluster Approach to managing emergency assistance was an outcome of the Humanitarian Reform process in 2005 which was led by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). This approach relies on the principle of strengthening partnerships between all actors as the key to improved coordination. The cluster approach was expected to clarify the division of labour among organisations, and better define their roles and responsibilities within the different sectors of the response. It was about making the international humanitarian community more structured, accountable and professional, so that it could be a better partner for host governments, local authorities and local civil society. This cluster approach was used in the implementation of the response to the floods. Each cluster has a lead UN agency, usually a technical lead in that sector, coordinating efforts in partnership with the Government of Pakistan who is overall responsible for the sector on behalf of the people of the country. The 12 established clusters are currently operating in Punjab, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Balochistan. The clusters also comprise of various International and local NGOs working as partner service providers. Table 6 below gives a list of the cluster chair/co chairs and Government counterparts.

Table 5: Cluster Lead and Government Counterpart

Cluster	Cluster – Role division	
	Primary Governmental Counterpart	Cluster Lead Agency
Agriculture	Ministry of Agriculture	FAO
Community Restoration	NDMA & PDMA	UNDP
Food	NDMA & PDMA	WFP
Health	Ministry of Health	WHO
Shelter & NFIs	NDMA & PDMA	IOM
WASH	Ministry of Environment, Provincial Public Health Engineering	UNICEF

	Departments	
Logistics, Emergency Telecommunications	NDMA & PDMA	WFP
Coordination	NDMA & PDMA	OCHA
Nutrition	Ministry of Health	UNICEF
Education	Ministry of Education	UNICEF / Save the Children
Protection	Ministry of Social Welfare	UNHCR
Camp management/ Camp Coordination	NDMA & PDMA	UNHCR

20. The expectation that the cluster system will provide leadership, reinforce partnerships, strengthen accountability and improve strategic field-level coordination and prioritization in specific sectors of response has not been fully met. The cluster system provides a good forum to discuss issues but the issues which are discussed at the cluster meetings are not always strategic and lack the mechanism to provide good overall information on the targets, achievements and remaining gaps. The cluster system also tends to be very UN-centric. Government presence in the clusters has been very limited and their role as the Co-Chair of the clusters was largely ignored. The system was dominated by foreign management with little knowledge of local practices. The system has also been unable to effectively coordinate, monitor or track the relief and early recovery efforts. The responsibility for lack of efficacy of this approach rests partly on the shoulder of the government agencies, partly on the UN partners and partly on donors. The cluster system also has limitations in that not all the partners operating in the country opt to operate within the cluster system which poses challenges in coordination, cooperation, information sharing and monitoring and evaluation. UNOCHA, the agency which is expected to coordinate the overall effort claims it cannot make the organizations within the cluster respond to it or hold them accountable.

21. Donors have not been very active in engaging with the clusters. Among the donors, only EU and DFID have been active in this regard with USAID participating actively in the Agriculture sector and a few of the other clusters. Many non-traditional donors and development partners operate in isolation complicating the joint relief efforts in effectively coordinating, setting priorities and identifying areas of duplication or delivering aid where it is most needed. Information sharing between government agencies, NGOs, INGOs and the UN needs improvement. All actors on ground need to be encouraged to share information with the coordinating body at the district level to ensure participation of all relevant stake holders in policy formation and coordination of ongoing efforts. Hence a comprehensive information management system is required to ensure aid-effectiveness. Donor agencies need to attend cluster meetings to better understand the financial needs of the various clusters, and thereby fund agencies in need, rather than only agencies with which they have traditional ties or previous working relationships. .

22. Experience in Pakistan shows that the emergency response has been most effective when there is strong leadership at the provincial and district level. In the absence of a strong counterpart agency at the local level which is able to provide leadership and strong analysis of needs and gaps, the UN system has not been very effective in playing this role at the local level. The Government of Khyber Paktunkwa has been able to coordinate the emergency response much more effectively compared with Punjab and Sindh which lacked strong leadership and coordination at the provincial and district levels with regards to disaster response management in many locations. The reports from the Disaster Risk Management Coordinators at the district level also support this contention. Where a strong District Coordination Officer or a strong Deputy Commissioner has been present to provide leadership, he has made the coordination and the response much more effective. This includes information, coordination, support and leading the many actors present in the area. The humanitarian community has difficulty in quickly establishing

coordination stations where the effort is most needed i.e. at the district levels. While the District Coordination Officer is the nodal agency on ground, the capacity to lead the regular and time consuming role of disaster management/response communication and coordination amongst all operating partners on the ground, becomes challenging without dedicated staff for this purpose.

23. After the floods, several regional hubs were also established to ensure better coordination at the regional level to partly address this issue of information sharing. In addition, UNDP has provided Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Coordinators in selected districts to help in the effort. The success of appointing the DRM Coordinators appears to depend once again upon how effectively they are used by the leadership at the district level and their linkages with the OCHA/cluster system. Without support from the district government they will have a limited role and without acceptance from the cluster coordinators they will have little access to information.

24. One of the principals of aid effectiveness is coordination, accountability and transparency. The OCHA office has been negligent in its responsibility of monitoring and sharing expenditure reports. It blames this on the participating agencies claiming that they do not respond to it. Some hold that the agency headquarters do not allow sharing of this information. It would be a matter of great concern if donors are not being provided these reports either. These reports must be shared with the Government of Pakistan on whose behalf these funds were received. The aid effectiveness agenda will continue to be undermined by donors through provision of funds outside of the response plan and without sharing full information on how these funds are being used. Currently there are inadequate systems in place for transparent information on expenditure and support by the international INGOs and UN organizations. At least no information on these aspects is shared with NDMA.

25. The UN system also does not appear to hold itself fully accountable in terms of how effectively and efficiently it has delivered the emergency assistance it has received on behalf of the country. At least no information on these aspects is shared with the counterpart government agencies. The UN agencies funded under the Response Plan do not have any direct accountability to any government agency for the funding that they have received. They trace their reporting responsibility to the donor agency financing them. The efficiency with which the emergency assistance was delivered by various agencies and its cost-effectiveness are not reported to the Government. There are no standard benchmarks available against which the performance of the UN system has been evaluated and no cross country comparison methodology available. There is limited discussion of the performance of the participating agencies and lack of agreed indicators against which the overall performance can be measured. Admittedly, while these factors are not appropriate to focus upon when the immediate task of relief and early recovery is paramount but there is a need to evaluate the process at an opportune time to assess the overall value for money and cost-effectiveness of services provided.

D. Coordination and Communication

26. By the end of December 2010, the Disaster response and rehabilitation effort involved over 89 NGOs and INGOs directly and numerous others participating indirectly, 16 UN agencies, the private sector, individual philanthropists, the armed forces, provincial and district governments and various federal and provincial level ministries, departments and organizations. On the other side, there were 20 million affected people spread over vast rural areas, with linguistic and cultural differences, rural literacy rate of just 48%, chronic gender disparities in terms of access to relief goods and aid services. Communication and coordination was a critical challenge which all agencies were not able to surmount. The International Organization on Migration (IOM) was the lead communication agency for the cluster system for the humanitarian response. Information from IOM district officers was received on a daily basis, and a system of two-way information sharing was implemented by IOM at the district level. However, this has not effectively translated into an effective information sharing system with government agencies, specifically the NDMA or with cluster coordinators. Some agencies performed better than others such as the World Food Program (WFP) which has well planned strategic communication objectives and guidelines.

27. A separate review of the communication needs during the flood response commissioned by NDMA¹² judged that the programme and strategic communication needs had not been addressed as required. The Communication cluster was not coordinated effectively, hence NDMA took the lead to ensure adequate gap analysis, strategizing and putting in place feedback mechanisms. Communication officers deployed in KPK, Sindh and Punjab (covering 50 of the 78 affected districts), provided daily updates of communication specific information. Call centers were in place, run by both the NDMA and the IOM, to deal with programme communication queries, and had developed a regularly updated Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) list to respond to the necessary queries covering a broad scope of flood relief activities. However, going forward, major efforts need to be made on the part of all government and cluster stakeholders to ensure the implementation of the two-way communication system. It was also determined that there was a pressing need for a comprehensive needs assessment to be conducted for districts that had been overlooked, especially in Balochistan, and immediate deployment of district communication officers in these areas.. Analyzing trends of feedback need to be regularized and fed into program planning at all levels of coordination and strategic meetings. The UN agencies could also enhance and improve their response strategies by learning from the communication and feedback systems deployed during the flood response. A grievance redress system also needs to be put in place to obtain feedback on the performance of all agencies by the public.

E. Monitoring & Evaluation

28. There were several monitoring challenges during the response plan. An initial lack of dedicated information management capacity in some clusters led to missed opportunities for improving the efficiency, effectiveness and visibility of the humanitarian response. Data collection and analysis had been hampered by the lack of uniform and standardized reporting formats, especially at the local and provincial levels, and by a lack of clearly-defined roles and responsibilities relating to data reporting and sharing. Pakistan has experienced the cluster system since 2005 and lessons learned from 3 major humanitarian response seemed to have been missed. This again indicates the lack of institutional memory of the lessons within the cluster managers.

29. One of the first initiatives was to develop a coordinated and effective monitoring system to be implemented for over 150 partners over three tiers. It was expected that a good system of monitoring & evaluation of humanitarian assistance projects could improve the effectiveness of aid delivered in Pakistan. The Response Plan stated that the impact and results of the humanitarian community's contribution would be measured against a set of agreed key performance indicators at the strategic, cluster and project levels. For the first time Government was imposing the results oriented aid effectiveness agenda on humanitarian appeal. Monitoring and reporting against these indicators was to be based on the roll-out of the Single Reporting Format (SRF) a tool designed by NDMA information management team supported by IMMAP as its technical partner with UN OCHA information management team), The SRF would allow partners to demonstrate their progress against the strategies presented in the Plan via a monthly online reporting format. It was envisaged that the Single Reporting Format would collect information on agreed indicators (see box below) to track progress against objectives. An online reporting system to facilitate data entry was in the process of being developed, and was reported to be in its final testing phase. A series of training workshops to support humanitarian organizations (especially field-based staff) who were to use the new reporting formats were to be carried out b NDMA and the UN immediately after the launch of the response plan to pave the way for the first round of reporting. Provincial Government counterparts both PDMA and line departments concerned are also to be invited to participate in the SRF briefing before the training roll out.

12. Draft Programme Communication Strategy Pakistan Floods 2010. NDMA. January 2011.

Box 1: Single Reporting Format Indicators

Project budgets and expenditure
Partners (including government agencies and implementing partners)
Project locations (to *tehsil* level)
Beneficiaries
Activity types and outputs
Key performance indicators

30. Up to the end of December 31, 2010, IMMAP was still in the process of finalizing the Single Reporting Format. While the NDMA information management team has conducted several meetings to ensure the participation of the key stakeholders and implementing partners in the process, the individual cluster members, participating organizations, government agencies at the federal, provincial and district level do not feel like they have been sufficiently involved. Further the UNOCHA unilateral approach to design development and training without government support and approvals has resulted in a number of observations; the SRF had overlooked the inclusion of the approved vulnerability categories and would not have allowed disaggregated monitoring and evaluation of the vulnerable. Approved modalities regarding expenditure reports in the appeal documents M&E section were also excluded for the convenience of agencies apprehension regarding sharing of financial expenditure reports. NDMA was able to point these very important exclusions and had the SRF revised to include these in the indicator columns. As a result, the presentation of the Single Reporting Format by the NDMA technical support team, IMMAP and OCHA has invited a fair amount of criticism on its structure and some of the terminology used. NDMA has developed an information management strategy. Feedback from the field has been solicited to ensure there is a coherent overarching system for all partners to follow. However, NDMA is seriously concerned about the delay in the finalization of the format, the general perception that the key stakeholders have not been involved in the process and the lack of an effective system of monitoring and evaluation even six months after the floods. The reasons for the delay need to be immediately investigated and remedial measures taken to ensure that the SRF is rolled out as soon as possible. The SRF also needs to be tested in terms of its promise that it will be a common web platform for all Implementing Partners (IP's) to report on their humanitarian activities and will enable better coordination of humanitarian assistance in Pakistan. While the SRF will help to organize information on the work of those agencies which opt to report on the designed format, it is unlikely to solve the problem which many clusters face regarding agencies that simply prefer not to report.

31. A second issue with respect to monitoring was the identification of the monitoring indicators. While each cluster had developed specific monitoring indicators, there was a concern that some of these had not been thought through very carefully and that for some sectors like agriculture there were far too many indicators to be monitored. NDMA took the lead in designing monitoring and evaluation indicators, developing vulnerability definitions and stressing the need for disaggregated data. It requested UNOCHA to organize a workshop to which it invited cluster members to review the list of indicators. NDMA also provided some technical support and assistance for the purpose. A meeting was held with the cluster leaders on October 1, 2010 to finalize the monitoring indicators for the Response Plan (FERP) and to elaborate on the single monitoring format which had been devised by OCHA for the purpose. Each of the clusters undertook to finalize the preliminary list of indicators based on the feedback and response obtained from the meeting. While some clusters were able to narrow down the list of indicators to a few robust and meaningful indicators, the revised Flood Emergency Response Plan did not incorporate all of these in the plan. This highlights some of the coordination and communication challenges that exist in trying to work with a large number of organizations and partly reflect UN's reluctance to address the Government's concerns regarding the indicators.

F. Gender Issues

32. The McCRAM used a gender disaggregated system for assessing the damage caused by the floods and the priorities of the men and women separately. However, some of the responses do give cause for concern as to whether the enumerators were sensitized on gender issues and whether they were able to properly reflect the responses. The Damage Needs Assessment conducted by the World Bank and Asian Development Bank included a separate section on women and noted that women were generally barely visible in the public spheres, particularly in rural areas. The Preliminary Gender Needs Assessment report by UNIFEM reported its concern that women may become unnoticed in the compensation process as their economic contribution was usually invisible and noted specific areas of concern under each cluster in September 2010A review of the multiple 'gender' forums in the UN system suggests that there is considerable duplication of efforts and resources. There is need for co-ordination of efforts among the UN agencies and ensuring that gender perspective is properly incorporated in the emergency response and that women's issues are addressed.

33. There has been a general level of dissatisfaction of reporting on how the UN agencies have dealt with gender issues during the floods and what special measures were taken to ensure that some of the areas of concern identified at the start have been effectively dealt with by the UN system. UN Women has been tracking this issue. However, gender-disaggregated data is not presented in the clusters and this has been a matter of concern for those trying to understand how some gender specific issues have been dealt with. This is a matter of concern since most of the UN cluster partners are long term development partners and expected to be gender sensitive. The SRF should provide gender disaggregated data. It is expected that the monitoring and evaluation system will be able to track and follow up on some of the issues of concern raised. There has been no comprehensive assessment of how far the gender issues were addressed during the PFRERP. NDMA would like to propose a more proactive role by UN Women in this regard and a system of tracking gender disaggregated data

III. THE KEY CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

34. As a result of the combined effort of all those involved, many lives were saved through prompt search and rescue action and by evacuating whole villages and towns. It was initially feared that millions were at imminent risk of waterborne diseases which could have spread rapidly in the cramped conditions in the camps and relief centers. However, as a result of the massive humanitarian effort, no major outbreaks of disease or epidemics took place. Through weekly epidemiological bulletins, the World Health Organization and the Ministry of Health provided surveillance data to the Disease and Early Warning System. At the height of the relief effort, the Health Cluster provided enough medicines to cover the basic health needs of more than 6.7 million people. Over 235,000 people had been treated at the diarrhoea treatment centres (DTCs) set up in the aftermath of the floods. A total of 502 static and 58 mobile health outreach services were providing health care to around 8 million people.

35. Almost six months after the disaster, immediate needs of the worst affected and displaced have been met and there are virtually no more people left in the camps. At the height of the relief effort, the World Food Programme distributed food to 7 million beneficiaries. No one was reported to have died of starvation. Potable water was provided through a combination of water bottles, tankers, purification tablets and plants and repairing damaged schemes. Emergency shelter had been provided to 782,701 households or 49% of those affected by the floods under the UN Response Plan. By the end of December, one room or transitional shelters were committed for 116,306 households or 13% of those with completely damaged households. It is estimated that around 30% of the houses have already started to be rebuilt with help from other agencies, civil society and private individuals.

36. The flood had raised major concerns about the impact of the floods on rural livelihoods and food security in heavily flooded areas. Approximately 80 percent of the population in the flood-affected area depended on agriculture for their livelihood. The floods not only damaged agriculture crops and livestock but also destroyed irrigation infrastructure, storage facilities, agriculture machinery, agriculture input stocks and animal sheds. It is reported that FAO's flood response programme had provided wheat seeds, fertilizers and 1/2 kg vegetable seeds to 529,481 households and veterinary services to livestock to 282,703 households. The reports from the provinces indicated that most households had received inputs for planting of the Rabi wheat crop well in time. FAO is working with the Pakistan Space and Upper

Atmosphere Research Commission to generate information using satellite-based imagery and data to better assess the actual area under crops. The future plans of the agriculture cluster were to keep the livestock alive through provision of feed, medicines and transitional shelter, restoration of on-farm irrigation facilities, provision of seeds, fertilizers and implements for the upcoming spring (Kharif) planting season and continuing the land clearing and preparation of the affected land.

37. There is no one opinion on how the Flood Emergency Response Plan was managed. While some stakeholders are highly appreciative of the enormous financing and technical support provided to the country and appreciate the fact that major loss of life, disease and starvation was prevented and the agriculture sector which had recorded the worst damage was very quickly replanted for the next season. Others are very critical of the relief effort and point to long delays, inadequate response, poor coordination and use of excessive reliance on international organizations with little experience in Pakistan. However, this review shows that most of the targets which the Plan had set out to accomplish for the early relief period had been achieved especially in terms of the four clusters critical for survival. Nevertheless there are some key areas in which performance can be improved and lessons learnt for the future. Some of the key challenges and recommendations which emerge from this review are outlined below;

- a) *The End of the Relief Period:* An overview of the situation on the ground leads to the conclusion that there is no need to extend the relief period beyond January 31, 2011. There are only about 120,000 households still in the camps and the immediate relief needs of most of the affected have been addressed. The focus should now be on rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. It is recommended that NDMA in consultation with the PDMA/DDMA announce the end of the relief period.
- b) *Relationship of UN and Government:* The relationship between the Government of Pakistan, donors and UN Agencies is critical for the success of the response plan. The impression which is created is that the UN Agencies feel more accountable to donors than they do to the Government and the Government agencies feel that the funds which have been raised in the name of the country should be more effectively spent and reported upon. The relationship between the UN agencies and with their contracting NGOs and other cluster partners is also critical. Fissures develop in these relationships because of systemic weaknesses within the UN system, its limited accountability to Government and weak monitoring, reporting and communication arrangements. While many forums have been created to facilitate discussions between the partners, the tenor of this relationship has to be better managed so that all partners pull in the same direction.
- c) *District Level and Provincial Level Focus:* A key area of weakness in the way the flood response was managed was the lack of a mechanism to assess the needs and gaps at the district level in a coordinated manner. The unavailability of the information management systems both within the UN and the district DDMA's has led to multiple damage and needs figures and assessments. As a result, there are many districts which have been only partially covered and others where there is duplication. Where there was strong leadership by the Provincial Disaster Management Authority such as in KPK the donors were able to work in a more systematic manner. In districts with a strong and competent District Coordination Officer or a Deputy Commissioner the level of coordination was much better. However, there is need for a system at this level rather than a reliance on personalities. For the next phase of early recovery and reconstruction there would be a need to strengthen the coordination efforts at the district level. The use of the Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Coordinator could be useful for this purpose while the DDMA capacities are enhanced in accordance with the institutional strengthening program for disaster management authorities.
- d) *Damage Assessments:* Different agencies and clusters carry out different assessments without sharing the methodology and sample size with NDMA. Any future assessments

should be coordinated by UNOCHA and MCRAM which are the lead in this regard after agreeing on the basics with NDMA.

- e) *Geographic Information Systems and Surveys*: There are many GIS and Remote sensing activities being carried out by the partners on the ground. There can be various sensitivities associated with such unilateral initiatives. As a matter of policy all such activities should be coordinated by OCHA with NDMA. Standard protocols need to be developed before any agency launches any type of surveys or geographic information systems.
- f) *Strategic Approach*: The cluster meetings are a good forum for coordination and information sharing. However, not all the clusters are strategic in the manner in which issues are brought up and discussed. The membership needs to include Government to ensure ownership. The challenge for each of the clusters is to assess the overall gap in meeting the requirements of the affected population. Lessons can be learnt from the Shelter Cluster which took a very strategic approach to monitoring and even though the overall funding of the sector was small and it was unable to obtain the funding required it was able to report and monitor progress in a manner which was much more strategic than the other clusters. It kept a close eye on the overall targets and the gaps.
- g) *Monitoring & Evaluation System*: Inadequate monitoring and reporting are a system-wide problem and need to be addressed urgently. The Single Reporting Format should be finalized and rolled out as soon as possible in partnership with the key stakeholders. The system should also be tested to assess if it can deliver the promised outputs, its utility in producing a consolidated data base for all clusters and how this can help to identify gaps and assist in targeting of the relief and early recovery efforts. The efficacy of the system will depend upon the extent to which all agencies involved in the relief, early recovery and reconstruction phase participate in the on line reporting system. The UN Agencies and the District Coordinator Officers should make it mandatory for all those working at the district level to report on this basis. The NDMA information management team should demonstrate the utility of the system by producing the key indicators for each cluster and showing how it contributes to a reliable, efficient and cost-effective system of monitoring and reporting.
- h) *Financial Tracking System*: The UN system has been slow to respond to the Government's request for provision of expenditure reports by cluster, agency and province. Even when the reports are received they do not contain information on the agencies overhead costs, delivery costs and the proportion of funds received by the target beneficiaries. For the future It is very important to provide meaningful and complete information on the use of funds and the indicators which will enable an analysis of their use.
- i) *Performance Assessment*: A review of the performance of the UN Agencies in terms of the value for money, cost-effectiveness and efficiency with which they undertook the flood response is critical especially now when the most urgent tasks of relief and early recovery have been addressed. Each of the UN partners should be asked to present unit costs of delivering key services per beneficiary. The indicators of cost-effectiveness should be produced by staff skilled in the task such as the Vulnerability Assessment & Mapping Unit of World Food Programme, and where appropriate, third party auditors should be asked to verify these. This information should be compared with other countries where emergency response of a similar nature has been provided. This should be a standard practice for the UN agencies and the information generated should be used to promote greater transparency and accountability. In the long run measures of this nature could be used to enhance the credibility and reputation of the UN system and greater trust in the Government ability to effectively manage, utilize and monitor emergency donor assistance.

- j) Targeting: Targeting will become a key requirement in the next phase of emergency assistance since the displaced population in camps has mostly returned to their places of origin. Planning towards providing services in the places of origin need to be rolled out. The focus on planning must shift towards implementation and scaling up of activities in areas where more service providers are needed. The UN agencies, NDMA, PDMA and DDMA should discuss these jointly with implementing agencies and develop a clear strategy for each cluster. The gender and vulnerability targeting will have to be thought through separately and how the targeting relates to the Watan Card criteria will also have to be developed and coordinated.
- k) Gender Aspects: The UN Agencies need to provide an assessment of how well they have been able to meet their gender mandate. This is all the more important given all the problems noted in the DNA on the inability of response efforts to address the special needs of women. Gender disaggregated data should be provided to show the proportion of women included in the direct assistance provided within each cluster and the special strategies adopted to make the assistance more gender sensitive. Lessons from this experience can help inform NDMA's protection strategy during disaster management. UN Women can take a lead role in this together with all the other cluster leads.